Edward May v. Michael Cash by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-5-2015 
Edward May v. Michael Cash 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"Edward May v. Michael Cash" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 138. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/138 
This February is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
DLD-097        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-3444 
___________ 
 
EDWARD MAY, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL CASH, D.O.; STEVEN  BURK, P.A.; JASON KOPERA, R.N.; NORMAN 
WEIDLICH; JOHN SHEDLOCK, O.D.; JEANETTE NAGY PHARMACY; ANTHONY 
PAZCOQUIN 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-13-cv-00069) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 30, 2015 
Before:  FISHER, SHWARTZ and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 5, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Appellant Edward May appeals from the District Court’s entry of judgment1 
against him in a prisoner’s rights case alleging violation of May’s Eighth Amendment 
rights while he was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution, Loretto.  May 
sued a non-Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) contract optometrist and BOP medical and other 
personnel under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), 
alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.  Because May’s appeal fails 
to present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment 
against him on each of his claims.2  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 & I.O.P. 10.6.   
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We may affirm a District 
Court's judgment on any grounds supported by the record.  Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 
121, 122 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001).  Because we may affirm on any grounds supported by the 
record, we need not discuss every reason for dismissing each of May’s claims.3    We 
                                              
 
1 The District Court granted “The Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the 
Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment.”  We have considered the relevant standard 
for each claim disposed of by the District Court under Rule 12 and Rule 56. 
2 The non-BOP optometrist, John Shedlock, D.O., was dismissed from the case by 
separate order on January 23, 2014.  May filed a document consenting to the District 
Court’s dismissal of that defendant and waiving any objection to the Magistrate Judge’s 
recommendation of dismissal.  The claims against Shedlock are not at issue in this 
appeal.    
3 The defendants moved for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 56, 
and the District Court granted dismissal on multiple grounds.  We address here only those 
grounds necessary to affirm the District Court’s decision, i.e., May’s failure to exhaust 
his administrative remedies.  
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exercise de novo review over the District Court’s determination that May failed to 
exhaust administrative remedies.  See Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
 The District Court properly determined that it could not consider May’s claims 
because he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.  The Prison Litigation 
Reform Act (“PLRA”) prohibits an inmate from bringing a civil rights suit alleging 
specific acts of unconstitutional conduct by prison officials until he has exhausted 
available administrative remedies.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 
F.3d 65, 69 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to 
Bivens claims).   “[P]roper exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary” to satisfy  
the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.  Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006).   An 
untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal does not 
satisfy the exhaustion requirement, thereby precluding an action in federal court.  See id. 
at 93; Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 230 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that the PLRA’s 
exhaustion requirement contains a procedural default component).  The Magistrate Judge 
determined that May had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on each and every 
grievance he filed related to his medical care.  May objected, referring to the defendants’ 
exhaustion arguments as “diversions to the basis for complaint [sic]” and arguing that 
administrative filing No. TRT-NER-2012-05256 exhausted the administrative remedies 
for his claims.  That document specifically stated that it was “the description for [May’s] 
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claim of physical injury pursuant to the requirements of the Federal Tort Claims Act.” 
(“FTCA”).   
 The FTCA requires that a plaintiff present a claim to the appropriate federal 
agency and receive a written denial from the agency in order to exhaust administrative 
remedies on that claim.  28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); see also White–Squire v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
592 F.3d 453, 457 (3d Cir. 2010).  By contrast, exhaustion of a claim in a Bivens action 
requires completion of the BOP's Administrative Remedy Program.  See Porter v. Nussle, 
534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002); Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 68, 77 n.12 (3d Cir. 2000); 28 
C.F.R. §§ 542.13-542.15.  In order to complete exhaustion for such claims, an inmate 
must first attempt to resolve an issue informally, followed by submission of a form to the 
staff member designated to receive such grievances, and, finally, an appeal to the 
Regional Director. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.13, 542.14, 542.15.  May’s submission of an 
FTCA claim under the procedures for exhausting administrative remedies for such a 
claim does not fulfill the requirements for proper exhaustion of his administrative 
remedies for the Bivens claims.  The District Court properly determined that May did not 
complete the process required for exhaustion of his claims. 
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 There being no substantial question presented on appeal,4 we will summarily 
affirm the decision of the District Court dismissing May’s Bivens action for failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies. 
                                              
4 May also filed two documents in this Court requesting that he be permitted to withdraw 
his appeal and to cease payment of all filing fees.  In a Clerk order dated December 16, 
2014, this Court informed May that withdrawal of his appeal would not affect the status 
of his fees and gave him a period of time in which to renew the motion, should he so 
desire.  May did not respond to that order, and we will consider his requests to dismiss 
his appeal withdrawn.    
